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Abstract 
We examine the effect of the full set of bank capital regulations (capital stringency) on loan 
growth, using bank-level data for a maximum of 125 countries over the period 1998-2011. 
Contrary to standard theoretical considerations, we find that overall capital stringency only 
has a weak negative effect on loan growth. In fact, this effect is completely offset if banks 
hold moderately high levels of capital. Interestingly, the components of capital stringency 
that have the strongest negative effect on loan growth are those related to the prevention of 
banks to use as capital borrowed funds and assets other than cash or government securities. In 
contrast, compliance with Basel guidelines in using Basel- and credit-risk weights has a much 
less potent effect on loan growth. 
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1. Introduction 
Next to monetary and fiscal policy, the promotion of safety and soundness of financial 
intermediaries has become the third major pillar of public policy. The flagship of financial 
regulation is the set of regulations on bank capital, as a means to mitigate the risk of bank 
failures and associated systematic adverse macroeconomic developments. This paper 
analyzes the effect of the full gamut of capital regulations (termed capital stringency) on loan 
growth, using a global sample of banks from a maximum of 125 countries over the period 
1998 to 2011.  
 The theoretical debate on the relation between capital regulations (almost exclusively 
referring to capital requirements) and loan growth highlights that there are both negative and 
positive effects, with the former seemingly dominating the debate (for recent studies, see 
Berrospide and Edge, 2010; Cohen, 2013; Labonne and Lamé, 2014; Bridges et al., 2015; De 
Nicolo, 2015). Higher capital requirements would, in principle, lead banks to downward 
manage their risk-weighted assets to meet the requirement. This would essentially imply a 
downward shift in lending, especially if banks do not have high enough capital buffers and 
face either difficulty or high cost in raising new capital. The same argument can be made for 
other rules and regulations leading to increased capital stringency, as these regulations 
increase the burden and cost of raising capital and lead banks to curtail their risk-weighted 
assets. To the extent these effects pass to the real economy, higher capital stringency implies 
lower levels of investment and hurts economic growth.  
 In contrast, more stringent capital regulation can be credit growth-enhancing if it 
successfully shields the banking sector against crises that have a negative impact on the 
economy. The premise is that by increasing capital stringency, banks will curtail their more 
risky projects and rebalance their portfolios toward more prudent ones. Through the 
associated decline in the probability of bank defaults, higher-quality lending will expand in 
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the medium- to long-run, leading to a Pareto improvement in the market for loans, 
investment, and economic growth.  
 There are two novel elements in our study. First, we use the implications of the 
literature on capital requirements and credit growth, but turn the spotlight on the rather 
neglected effects of other types of capital stringency. De Nicolo (2015) is to our knowledge 
the only study providing a global analysis on the effect of capital requirements (rules on risk-
weighted assets, measured by the equity to asset ratio) on credit growth, but in this study the 
effect of the overall capital stringency (introduced by Barth et al., 2013) and its several 
subcomponents is not examined. Besides compliance with rules on risk-weighted assets, we 
also examine the effects of (i) the exclusion from risk-based capital ratio of loan losses, 
unrealized securities losses, and foreign exchange losses; and (iii) rules on the sources of 
initial and recapitalization of banks. To this end, our findings are directly relevant to both the 
lively policy debate on the impact of further raising capital requirements and to the 
unexplored effects of other important aspects of capital stringency.  
 Second, by looking at virtually all countries and associated regulatory practices, we 
provide the first global perspective on the nexus between general capital stringency and its 
individual components and loan growth. This analysis allows insightful suggestions from the 
large variation in the regulatory systems between countries, better identification of causal 
relations, differences in the results between groups of countries and across time, and 
associated policy implications.  
 We first examine the effect of general capital stringency on loan growth. This 
indicator encapsulates ten different regulatory laws on the three broader regulatory tools 
discussed above (Barth et al., 2013). These ten different policies receive an equal weight to 
construct a single general index of capital stringency. Subsequently, we decompose capital 
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stringency to its components to examine the separate effects of each one of these capital 
regulations on loan growth. 
 Our identification method builds on previous studies on the effects of macroeconomic 
variables on loan growth (e.g., Jimenez et al., 2012; Delis, 2012). We use bank-level panel 
data and assume that banks with different levels of capital and/or liquidity will be able to 
buffer the adverse effects of capital regulation on loan growth. Thus, we obtain inference 
from the interaction term between capital stringency (or its components) and the capital or 
liquidity of individual banks at the time there is a change in capital stringency. Given the 
additional inclusion in our model of a large set of bank-level, regulatory, and macroeconomic 
variables, as well as elimination of bank fixed effects via first differencing, this practice 
insulates our empirical model from demand-side and other macroeconomic explanations of 
the estimates. 
 We find that capital stringency has a negative effect on loan growth only for the banks 
with very low levels of capital. Specifically, a bank with a basic equity capital ratio close to 
the average in our sample (10%) needs to raise this ratio only by approximately 1% to 
completely buffer the negative effect of a one point increase in the level of the capital 
stringency index. This level of capital buffer is quite lower for banks that also have higher 
levels of liquidity compared to the average bank in our sample. Moreover, the negative effect 
of capital stringency almost completely disappears for a bank with an average level of capital 
if we exclude the period of the global financial crisis. 
 Our baseline results are robust to a number of re-specifications and sensitivity tests. 
One important sensitivity test, for the elimination from our model of demand-side 
explanations of our findings, is the introduction of a triple interaction term of capital 
stringency, bank capital, and a measure of bank importance in the financing of economic 
activity. We expect that if we failed to thoroughly control for demand-side elements affecting 
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the relation between capital stringency and credit provision, the coefficient estimates 
identified as supply-side forces will be weaker in the bank-based financial systems because in 
these systems there are limited alternative sources of finance and stronger demand for bank 
credit. However, we do not find a strong effect.  
To better understand which types of economies are affected by the more stringent 
capital requirements, we follow the analysis of Bekaert et al. (2007) who suggest that 
financial development and openness of the economy in particular play an important role on 
the growth opportunities of an economy. We document significant cross-country 
heterogeneity in our results with banks operating in countries more financially developed and 
open being able to raise capital more easily. 
 Further, by using three-year averages of our variables, we show that the negative 
effect of capital stringency further weakens in the medium- to long-run, but results do not 
turn positive as our theoretical priors would predict. This finding is also robust to taking 
longer-term averages of our variables. Thus, an increase in the general capital stringency 
index does not seem to have permanent effects on loan growth. This is in contrast to De 
Nicolo (2015), who suggests that the long-term effect of an increase in capital ratios on bank 
loans is significant and relatively large. 
 Looking at the components of capital stringency, we find that the adoption of Basel-
type risk-weighted capital ratios and credit-risk weights negatively affects loan growth, but 
again banks with moderately high levels of capital can insulate their lending from these 
policies. This finding is in line with the literature on the negative nexus between capital 
requirements and lending (e.g., Bridges et al., 2015; De Nicolo, 2015), but notes that the 
relevant effects are not as potent as previously thought. 
 In contrast, the most important negative effect comes from the adoption of very 
stringent rules concerning the initial disbursement or subsequent injections of capital. 
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Specifically, if regulation allows only cash or government securities to be used for the 
capitalization of banks, the average bank needs to almost double its equity capital to leave its 
loan growth unaffected. Given that this would be a very costly option, banks would most 
probably decide to significantly curtail their loans. Thus, it is the way banks capitalize their 
asset that has a negative effect on growth. This finding also shows that in the absence of such 
rules, the effect of other types of capital stringency on loan growth would be limited. Finally, 
we do not find significant effects from the exclusion from the risk-based capital ratio of loan 
losses, unrealized securities losses, and foreign exchange losses. 
 Besides the literature on the relation between capital requirements and loan growth, 
our analysis and findings relate to a large number of theoretical and empirical papers on the 
real effects of capital requirements. VanHoose (2008) and Athanasoglou et al. (2014) review 
this literature and suggest that the theoretical and empirical findings are mixed. For example, 
Blum and Hellwig (1995) theoretically show that bank capital regulation may reinforce 
macroeconomic fluctuations. Van den Heuvel (2008) shows that bank capital requirements 
result in a consumption-based welfare loss of up to 1% per annum. On the other hand, 
Admati et al. (2010) discuss thoroughly why raising new capital is not overly expensive for 
banks, which implies negligible macroeconomic effects.     
 The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical model, 
the identification method, and the data and variables used for the empirical analysis. Section 
3 discusses the empirical results. Section 4 offers policy implications and concludes the 
paper.       
 
2. Empirical identification and data 
2.1. Econometric identification 
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Our empirical analysis first considers the short-term effect of capital stringency on credit 
expansion of individual banks and subsequently the equivalent long-term responses. To this 
end, we consider the following reduced-form specification: 
𝐿𝑏,𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝐿𝑏,𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1(𝐿𝑏,𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐿𝑏,𝑖,𝑡−1)+𝑎2𝐶𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎3𝐵𝑏,𝑖,𝑡+𝑎4𝐶𝑆𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐵𝑏,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎5𝑋𝑏,𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜆𝑡+𝑣𝑏 + 𝑢𝑏,𝑖,𝑡 ,         (1) 
where L is the stock of loans of bank b operating in country i in year t; CS is the regulatory 
capital stringency in country i and year t; B is a set of bank characteristics (bank capital and 
liquidity as we discuss below) that allow identification of supply-side effects of capital 
stringency on loan growth; X is a vector of other bank- or country-level control variables; λ 
and v are year and bank fixed effects, respectively; and u is the remainder disturbance. We 
run most of our empirical tests using annual data (short-term responses), but we also consider 
longer-term responses using the equivalent model for three-year averages of the data.  
 An important problem in identifying a causal effect of capital stringency on loan 
growth is the potential existence of unobserved variables that are correlated with both CS and 
loan growth.1 These variables could be either unobserved bank characteristics like the 
demand faced for bank loans, or country-specific characteristics like other types of financial 
regulations, general (country-level) loan demand conditions, and elements of financial 
development.  
 We reduce this omitted-variable bias by taking a number of steps. First, the estimation 
of equation (1) in differences to eliminate bank fixed effects allows capturing the time 
invariant bank characteristics affecting loan growth. Thus, we obtain identification from the 
within-bank variation in loan growth before and after a change in capital stringency. Second, 
we use a full set of control variables for bank characteristics, other types of regulations, 
country-specific financial development, and the phase of the business cycle.  
                                                 
1 Given that the right-hand side variables explain future loan growth and we account for dynamics in loan 
growth in equation (1), reverse causality is a less significant problem. 
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 Third, we rely on an extensive literature suggesting that empirical identification of 
policy effects in loan-growth equations can be obtained from bank-level panel data and the 
interaction of a policy variable with certain bank characteristics (e.g., Kashyap and Stein, 
2000; Jimenez et al., 2012; Delis, 2012). The main argument of this literature is that banks 
with strong availability of capital and/or liquidity should be able to, at least partially, reduce 
the negative effects of capital requirements on loan growth. This would imply a negative 
coefficient on a2 in equation (1) and a positive coefficient on a4.  
 This type of analysis also reduces the potential effects of unobserved demand-side 
variables affecting loan growth. For example, the literature on the credit channel of monetary 
policy uses interaction terms between e.g. the monetary instrument and bank capital to 
identify changes in loan supply from changes in loan demand. In our analysis, capital 
regulation is by its own nature a policy primarily affecting the business model of banks (loan 
supply) and not so much the model of borrowers (loan demand). Still, the interaction term in 
equation (1) should further purify the coefficients of main interest from demand-side forces, 
because the level of capital buffers and liquidity at the time of a change in bank regulations is 
decided within the business model of banks. 
 Fourth, in an even more restrictive model, we introduce a triple interaction term 
between capital stringency, bank capital, and bank importance. The idea for this test follows 
from the premise that if there are still unobserved demand-side forces biasing our estimates in 
equation (1), then these would be more potent in countries where alternative sources of 
finance are relatively scarce. Thus, the coefficient on the triple interaction term would be 
statistically and economically significant. Essentially, this is a placebo test against the 
demand-side explanation of our findings.  
 Equation (1) represents a dynamic panel data model, and thus we estimate it using the 
GMM for dynamic panels proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) and discussed in an applied 
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setting by Roodman (2009).2 For efficiency-related reasons, we use the two-step estimator 
with robust standard errors, which are adjusted with Windmeijer’s (2005) correction 
procedure. The GMM also allows instrumenting the control variables (using lags) and reduce 
the potential endogeneity of these variables that could in turn bias the results on the 
coefficients of main interest. We test the validity of these instruments using a standard 
Hansen test and verify that our models do not suffer from autocorrelation.        
  
2.2. Data and variables 
We use bank-level data from Bankscope for a maximum of 125 countries over the period 
1998 – 2011.3 Table 1 provides a collective, formal definition of the variables in the 
empirical analysis and Table 2 provides summary statistics.  
[Insert Tables 1 & 2 about here] 
 Capital stringency is measured at the country-year level using an aggregate indicator 
that summarizes the laws and regulations on the capitalization of banks. The data for capital 
stringency are from the survey by Barth et al. (2013) and earlier versions. In the empirical 
analysis, we consider the effect of both the capital stringency indicator and its ten 
subcomponents on loan growth, the latter obtained at the bank-year level from Bankscope.  
 The ten components of capital stringency are: Basel risk-weights, credit risk-weights, 
market risk-weights, deducted loan losses, deducted securities, deducted foreign exchange 
losses, revaluation gains, initial stringency 1, initial stringency 2, and initial stringency 3. 
Each of these components answers to a different question concerning the commitment of the 
banks and regulators on specific types of capital stringency (see Table 1). Evidently, despite 
                                                 
2 Note that we write equation (1) in differences only with respect to the dependent variable (and its lag), but the 
rest of the variables are in levels. The reason is that we examine the effect of the right-hand side variables on 
loan growth (and not the level of lending). This is not to be confused with the procedures of the Blundell and 
Bond (1998) estimator, which uses both levels and differences in the estimation procedure (see Roodman, 
2009). Thus, equation (1), exactly as written, is estimated using the software modules for the Blundell and Bond 
estimator.    
3 We restrict our analysis to the period up to 2011 due to availability of data for capital regulations. 
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the adoption of the Basel guidelines by a large number of countries, the global difference in 
the level of overall capital stringency remains considerable (Barth et al., 2013). The ten 
components can broadly be grouped into regulations referring to (i) compliance with specific 
rules concerning risk-weighted assets (the first three components); (ii) exclusion from risk-
based capital ratio of loan losses, unrealized securities losses, and foreign exchange losses 
(second three components); and (iii) rules on the sources of initial and recapitalization of 
banks (last four components). 
As discussed above, the bank characteristics to be interacted with capital stringency 
and its components (named B in equation 1) are bank capital (measured by the ratio of equity 
capital to total assets)4 and bank liquidity (ratio of liquid assets to total assets). These are the 
variables used in most of the related literature to identify supply-side effects of 
macroeconomic determinants on bank-level outcomes (e.g., Kashyap and Stein, 2000; 
Jimenez et al., 2012; Delis, 2012). 
For the control variables (X in equation 1) we first use at the bank level the natural 
logarithm of total assets to control for bank size and the ratio of loan-loss provisions to total 
loans to control for credit risk.5 Further, an important set of control variables includes the 
level of financial development in each country and other types of bank regulations. 
Specifically, we use a measure of bank importance, which is calculated as the ratio of private 
credit provided by banks to stock market capitalization (data are from Beck et al., 2013). The 
higher is this ratio, the higher is the relative importance of bank-based finance (in a given 
country and year) compared to market-based finance of economic activity. Importantly, we 
                                                 
4 Perhaps a more informative measure of capital would be the Basel-related measure based on risk-weighted 
assets. However, there are severe data constraints in using this measure and such an analysis would imply 
dropping more than 90% of our sample, yielding clear sample selection problems and a much more limited 
scope for our analysis. Further, even where data exists, there is heterogeneity in the definition of risk-weighted 
assets between countries. For these reasons, most of the literature using an international sample of banks relies 
on the basic capital ratio (e.g., Delis, 2012). 
5 Perhaps a better measure of credit risk is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. Unfortunately, this 
measure is available for fewer banks in Bankscope and thus we prefer the provisions-based measure to avoid a 
significant reduction in the number of observations and country coverage. We do, however, examine the 
sensitivity of our results to the inclusion on the non-performing loans ratio. 
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also control for financial development (measured by the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP), 
especially given the common trends between higher capital stringency and increased financial 
development. Also, to prevent capital stringency from capturing the effects of other types of 
banking regulations, we use the database of Barth et al. (2013) to control for activity 
restrictions placed on banks (termed activity restrictions), the powers of the official 
supervisory authority (supervisory power), and the applicability of market-discipline related 
regulations (market discipline).6 We also use the interest-rate regulations variable from the 
Economic Freedom of the World Project to measure credit-market freedom. 
Moreover, we control for the general macroeconomic conditions prevailing in each 
country using GDP growth and investment growth (gross fixed capital formation). 
Information for these two variables is from the World Development Indicators (WDI). We 
also use trade openness (measured by the sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP), the 
level of government expenditure as a share of GDP, and the real interest rate and the inflation 
rate (to control for the monetary conditions prevailing in each country). 
 In turn, we use a number of institutional indices to explain loan growth. We resort to 
the variable characterizing the quality of the legal system and the enforcement of laws (rule 
of law) from the Worldwide Governance Indicators. We experiment with many other relevant 
indices (e.g., the ones from the International Country Risk Guide, the Freedom House, and 
the Polity IV project), but we find that most are insignificant determinants of loan growth in 
our sample or are highly correlated with rule of law. 
   
3. Estimation results 
3.1. Effect of general capital stringency 
                                                 
6 Comprehensive definitions are provided in Table 1. See also Claessens and Laeven (2004), Beck et al. (2006), 
Cihak et al. (2012), Barth et al. (2013). 
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We begin our empirical analysis by using annual data to examine the short-term response of 
loan growth to capital stringency. To identify the GMM models, we use as instruments the 
second lags of all right-hand side control variables. This practice also reduces endogeneity 
concerns stemming from bias in the estimation of control variables.7 As indicated in the 
lower part of our tables, the use of these instruments yields values on the AR2 and Hansen 
tests that easily reject the null hypotheses of second-order autocorrelation and invalid 
instruments, respectively.    
 In Table 3 we report six variants of equation (1) based on the use of different control 
variables and identification through interaction terms with bank capital or bank liquidity.  All 
equations include year fixed effects (bank fixed effects are eliminated by the GMM). We 
mean-center the variables involved in the interaction terms to directly interpret the estimates 
on the main term as the effect of e.g. capital stringency for the bank with an average level of 
bank capital.  
 In column (1) we report the results with controls for bank characteristics, other types 
of bank regulations, financial development, and economic growth. The results on the main 
term of capital stringency show that a one point increase in this variable decreases loan 
growth by 3.5%. However, the interaction term shows that even for moderate levels of bank 
capital, the negative effect of capital stringency vanishes. Specifically, by taking the 
derivative of loan growth with respect to capital stringency, we find that the average bank in 
our sample needs to increase its basic equity capital ratio by an additional 2% (calculated by 
subtracting the average of 0.10 in our sample from 0.035/0.291=0.12) to completely buffer 
the effect of an increase in capital stringency. In column (2), where we additionally control 
for the rest of the macroeconomic variables, the equivalent required increase in bank capital 
is only 1%. We use this specification as our baseline model to form policy implications. 
                                                 
7 As we suggest in the previous section, the main reason for using these instruments is not to identify the causal 
effect of capital stringency (which is identified through the interaction terms), but rather to deal with the 
dynamic nature of our model.  
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[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 In columns (3) and (4) we repeat the analysis of the first two columns with bank 
liquidity interacted with capital stringency.  The results are quite similar with those reported 
in the first two columns, with the most liquid banks being able to buffer the negative effect of 
an increase in capital stringency. However, in contrast to the results in the first two columns, 
a more substantial liquidity injection is required for the average bank in our sample to 
mitigate the adverse effects of capital stringency.    
 Given that capital is the main policy variable in banking, we further refine our results 
by including in columns (5) and (6) the triple interaction term between capital stringency, 
bank capital, and bank liquidity. This analysis provides a more restrictive model against 
demand-side omitted variables because it includes both types of bank characteristics as 
interactive terms. In line with the results of the previous specifications, we find that both 
higher levels of capital and liquidity contribute to mitigating the adverse effects of increase 
capital stringency. Working with the results of the specification with the full set of control 
variables (column 6) and using the mean value of bank liquidity in our sample (equal to 
0.18), we calculate the level of bank capital at which the negative effect of capital stringency 
is reversed to again be approximately 11%.   
 In a nutshell, the results from the baseline specifications of Table 3 show that only a 
very moderate increase in the basic equity capital ratio is sufficient to completely eliminate 
the negative effect of an increase in regulatory capital stringency on loan growth. Capital 
stringency changes in our sample from approximately 6.06 in 1997 to approximately 7.71 in 
2011, which is an increase of 1.65 points. For this increase, and again using the results in 
column (2) of Table 3, bank capital needs to increase by 1.65% points to completely buffer 
the effects. Evidently, the basic capital ratio increased from an average of about 8% in 1997 
to an average of about 11% in 2011, which more than covers the negative effects of increased 
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capital stringency, while in this period our data show an average 8% annual expansion in 
lending. We may conclude from this analysis that increased stringency in bank capital 
regulations does not have a strong negative effect on loan growth.  
  A better measure of credit risk is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans, 
although this measure is available for fewer banks. As a robustness check, we use non-
performing loans instead of provisions (see Table A1 of the Appendix) and we observe that 
the results are similar to those of Table 3.      
 We carry out an extensive set of sensitivity tests on these main results. First, in the 
specifications of Table 4, we exclude the time period after the eruption of the global financial 
crisis (i.e., we exclude the period from 2008 onward).8 The concern with the inclusion of the 
crisis period is that, despite controlling for relevant variables, there could still be an 
endogenous relation between capital stringency, bank capital availability, and other elements 
of the regulatory and macroeconomic environment. The source of this endogeneity can be 
traced, inter alia, in other unobserved policy responses to the crisis or to unobserved local 
factors contributing to the capital and liquidity crunch during the crisis period.  
 In general, the results show that even lower levels of capital (see columns 1 and 2) 
and liquidity (see columns 3 and 4) are required to completely buffer the negative effect of 
capital stringency on loan growth. Specifically, according to the results in column (2), a bank 
with an equity capital ratio very close to our sample’s average can completely offset the 
negative effect of capital stringency and, according to the results in column (4), the same 
holds for a bank with a liquidity ratio approximately equal to 20% (and bank capital equal to 
our sample’s mean value). These findings are intuitive given that the higher availability of 
capital and liquidity in normal economic periods provides ample room for capital and 
                                                 
8 For expositional brevity, we report from this point onward only the estimates on the variables of main interest. 
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liquidity management to stimulate loan growth and banks are not reluctant to use capital 
buffers to this end.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 Second, we analyze whether our results are different between bank- and market-based 
economies. We expect that if we failed to thoroughly control for demand-side elements 
affecting the relation between capital stringency and credit provision, the coefficient 
estimates identified as supply-side forces will be weaker in the bank-based financial systems 
because in these systems there are limited alternative sources of finance and stronger demand 
for bank credit. To test this premise, we introduce the triple interaction term between capital 
stringency, bank capital, and bank importance. We find (column 1 of Table 5) that this term 
is statistically insignificant, implying that we do not identify differences in our baseline 
results in systems where borrowers rely more on bank credit and thus potentially having more 
inelastic demand for bank loans.  
 There could, however, exist other country-specific sources of heterogeneity in our 
results, without these sources being specifically related to demand-side explanations of our 
findings. For example Bekaert et al. (2007) stress the importance of financial openness and 
financial development on economic growth and show that in more integrated economies, 
growth opportunities are better aligned with actual growth, with financial openness being 
quite important. In general, the effect of market regulations on loan growth may be quite 
different in open economies than in segmented economies, because both the supply and 
demand for credit may have international components and banks may raise capital more 
easily.  
 To examine the role of financial development and openness in the relation between 
capital stringency and loan growth, we introduce (in different specifications) triple interaction 
terms including financial development and trade openness. We expect that the more 
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financially developed or open an economy is, the easier will be for the banks to buffer the 
negative effects of an increase in capital stringency. The results in columns (2) and (3) of 
Table 5 are in line with these expectations. In particular, in both specifications the triple 
interaction term is positive indicating indeed that banks operating in more financially 
developed or more open economies face smaller constraints to raise capital and, accordingly, 
do not limit their lending capacity. Thus, our findings suggest that an important prerequisite 
for the increase of capital stringency is at least a certain level of financial development and 
openness.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 Third, we consider whether any identified responses are short-lived and weaken with 
time. The main argument of the proponents of increased capital regulation is that higher 
capital reduces the risk of bank default and, in the medium- to long-run, the intermediation 
margin would decline. In turn, this process would stimulate economic growth via the 
expansion in quality lending (e.g., Bridges et al., 2015).  
 To test this hypothesis in our framework, we take three-year averages of the data and 
repeat the exercise of Table 3. The results (reported in Table 6) show a much weaker 
response of loan growth to the interaction term of capital stringency with bank capital 
(columns 1 and 2) or bank liquidity (columns 3 and 4) or with both (columns 5 and 6). Where 
there is statistical significance at the 10% level (mainly in the first two columns), the levels of 
capital required to completely offset the adverse effects of increased capital stringency are 
very close to our sample’s mean values. Thus, we conclude that in the medium- to long-run 
the very modest short-term negative effects of capital stringency on loan growth further 
weaken. In a nutshell, we do not identify any reversal toward a positive effect of capital 
stringency in the long run. In unreported regressions, we also use five-year averages of the 
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data to examine whether the effect of capital stringency turns positive in the longer term, but 
we do not find such effects (the statistical significance of the estimates further weakens). 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 As a final sensitivity test, we consider the inclusion of interaction terms of bank 
capital and/or liquidity with all the country-year level variables included in the empirical 
analysis. The aim of these specifications is to further shut down alternative channels through 
which demand- or supply-side forces affect our results. For example, by interacting capital 
and/or liquidity with interest rate we better control for the credit channel of monetary policy 
transmission, while the respective interaction terms with financial development and GDP 
growth better control for the Tobin’s q theory and other wealth effects. We report the main 
results in Table 7. Evidently, changes in the results compared to those of Table 3 are minimal 
and, therefore, we can dismiss these alternative explanations of our main findings. 
          [Insert Table 7 about here] 
               
3.2. Decomposing general capital stringency into its components  
In this subsection, we decompose capital stringency into its ten components to pinpoint the 
sources of the (modest) effects of general capital stringency on loan growth. We work in the 
same way with the regressions including the general capital stringency index and estimate 
equation (1) by interacting each capital stringency component with bank capital (results in 
Table 8) or liquidity (results in Table 9). Thus, each of the ten specifications separately 
includes one of the ten components of capital stringency, and a control variable for the rest of 
the nine components to avoid a relevant omitted-variable bias. 
          [Insert Tables 8 & 9 about here] 
 Evidently, the components of capital stringency that contribute to statistically 
significant main and interaction effects of capital stringency in the previous tables are: (i) in 
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column (1) the adoption of the Basel guideline for the capital requirement (Basel risk 
weights); (ii) in column (2) the variation of the risk-based capital ratio with a bank’s credit 
risk (credit risk weights); (iii) in column (8) the allowance of other sources of capital besides 
cash and government securities to be used as initial disbursement or subsequent injections of 
capital (initial stringency 1); and (iv) the allowance of borrowed funds to be used for initial 
disbursement of capital (initial stringency 2). These findings are robust to using interaction 
terms with either capital or liquidity with the exception of credit risk weights, which loses its 
statistical significance when interacted with bank liquidity. 
 The results of Tables 8 and 9 show that moderate levels of bank capital and liquidity 
are required to offset the impact of the adoption of Basel- and credit-risk weights 
(approximately 12% bank capital for both and 21% bank liquidity for Basel-risk weights). In 
contrast, it takes very large values of bank capital (20% and 15%) to buffer a change in the 
values on initial stringency 1 and initial stringency 3 from zero to one. This result reinforces 
our basic result of section 3.1., suggesting that it is the restrictions a bank faces to raise 
capital that mainly drive the negative result of capital stringency on growth.  
 These results show that indeed certain components of increased capital stringency, 
especially related to the prevention of using assets other than cash and government securities 
as capital, do hurt loan growth and, potentially, investment opportunities. We should note, 
however, that only 4 out of the 125 countries take in the end year of our sample a value one 
in initial stringency 1, which is the variable mostly hurting loan growth. Thus, countries can 
indeed avoid excess losses in loan growth by at least allowing multiple sources for the initial 
disbursement and subsequent injections of capital, while adopting Basel capital requirements 
to maintain a less risky banking sector. Also, the statistical insignificant results on the rest of 
the stringency components show that such policies do not hurt loan growth on average.  
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 These results are in general robust to the re-specifications of equation (1) in line with 
the analysis on the capital stringency in Section 3.1. Specifically, the results are almost 
identical to those of Tables 8 and 9 when we disregard the crisis period, when splitting our 
sample to bank-based and market-based economies, and when we add interaction terms of 
bank capital or liquidity with all the country-year variables. When using the three-year 
averages, we find that the only source of capital stringency having a persistently strong 
negative effect on loan growth is initial stringency 1. This further highlights the need to relax 
constraints on the sources of bank capital besides cash and government securities to prevent 
long-term adverse effects of capital stringency on credit growth.       
 
4. Discussion and policy implications 
In this study we examine the effect of general capital stringency and its individual 
components on loan growth. We find that general capital stringency has a negative effect on 
loan growth, but this effect is quite low for well-capitalized banks and is completely offset for 
banks with an equity capital ratio equal to 11% (just 1% above the average in our sample) in 
our preferred specification. Among the components of the general index of capital stringency, 
the strongest negative effect comes from the prevention of banks from using assets other than 
cash and government securities as capital. In contrast, the Basel-related capital requirements 
have effects that are quite manageable for well-capitalized banks, especially if policy changes 
are implemented during normal economic periods. Finally, our results do not suggest any 
long-term effects of capital regulations on loan growth.   
 Our findings have at least three important policy implications. First and foremost, 
even though our results do not deviate from the general premise that compliance with Basel-
type capital requirements lowers loan growth, we find that it is relatively easy for banks to 
buffer these effects without decreasing their loans. This is especially true, if there are no 
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constraints on the assets that can be used as new capital. In turn, this encourages the abolition 
of rules and regulations regarding the sources of funds to be used as capital, especially in the 
recent periods when capital requirements increase in most countries. Thus, our results are 
suggestive of a policy mixture of increased capital stringency targeted at the risk-side of the 
banking activities and increased freedom in the use of alternative assets as capital.  
 Second, our results reinforce the arguments favoring implementation of more 
stringent risk-related capital regulation during good economic times. Evidently, the trend 
across most countries toward increased capital stringency before the global financial crisis 
(by adopting Basel’s guidelines on capital requirements) had no apparent effect on credit 
availability. One could in fact credibly suggest that credit growth increased to unsustainable 
amounts leading to credit bubbles that increased the probability of bank defaults.  
 Third, we should note that we cannot undoubtedly suggest, based on our findings, that 
the even more stringent capital requirements of Basel III will not hurt the real economy 
through a reduction of bank credit. We did carry out an initial analysis to examine non-linear 
effects of further increases in capital stringency (especially related with higher capital 
requirements), but the results are not suggestive of such effects. However, the guidelines of 
Basel III include regulations that are not formally modelled by existing indices and we must 
be cautious about this initial set of results. Therefore, we leave this for future research once 
relevant data become available.   
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Table 1. Variable definitions and sources 
Variable Description Source 
 
A. Dependent variable 
   
Loan growth Annual growth in gross loans by bank. Bankscope 
 
B. Main explanatory variables  
 
Capital stringency 
 
Shows the general capital stringency of the banking systems 
and is the sum of the above ten components. 
 
Barth et al. (2003, 2013) 
Basel risk weights Dummy that takes the value one if the answer to the question 
“Is the bank capital ratio risk-weighted in line with Basle 
guidelines?” is yes and zero otherwise. 
Barth et al. (2003, 2013) 
Credit risk weights Dummy that takes the value one if the answer to the question 
“Does the ratio vary with a banks' credit risk?” is yes and zero 
otherwise. 
Barth et al. (2003, 2013) 
Market risk weights Dummy that takes the value one if the answer to the question 
“Does the ratio vary with market risk?” is yes and zero 
otherwise. 
Barth et al. (2003, 2013) 
Deducted loan losses Dummy that takes the value one if the answer to the question 
“Before minimum capital adequacy is determined which 
items are deducted from capital?” is the market value of loan 
losses and zero otherwise. 
Barth et al. (2003, 2013) 
Deducted securities Dummy that takes the value one if the answer to the question 
“Before minimum capital adequacy is determined which 
items are deducted from capital?” is unrealized securities 
losses and zero otherwise. 
Barth et al. (2003, 2013) 
Deducted foreign exchange 
losses 
Dummy that takes the value one if the answer to the question 
“Before minimum capital adequacy is determined which 
items are deducted from capital?” is unrealized foreign 
exchange losses and zero otherwise. 
Barth et al. (2003, 2013) 
Revaluation  gains Dummy that takes the value one if the answer to the question 
“What fraction of revaluation gains is allowed as part of 
capital?” is lower than 0.75 and zero otherwise. 
Barth et al. (2003, 2013) 
Initial stringency 1 Dummy that takes the value one if the answer to the question 
“Can the initial disbursement or subsequent injections of 
capital be done with assets other than cash or government 
securities?” is no and zero otherwise. 
Barth et al. (2003, 2013) 
Initial stringency 2 Dummy that takes the value one if the answer to the question 
“Are the sources of funds to be used as capital verified by the 
regulatory/supervisory authorities?” is yes and zero otherwise. 
Barth et al. (2003, 2013) 
Initial stringency 3 Dummy that takes the value one if the answer to the question 
“Can initial disbursement of capital be done with borrowed 
funds?” is no and zero otherwise. 
Barth et al. (2003, 2013) 
 
C. Control variables 
 
Bank importance The ratio of private credit provided by banks to stock market 
capitalization. Stock market capitalization as a share of GDP. 
Stock market capitalization equals the value of listed shares 
divided by GDP.   
Beck et al. (2000) 
Activity restrictions The score for this variable is determined on the basis of the 
level of regulatory restrictiveness for bank participation in: 
(1) securities activities, (2) insurance activities, (3) real estate 
activities, and (4) bank ownership of non-financial firms. 
These activities can be unrestricted, permitted, restricted or 
prohibited and are assigned the values of 1, 2, 3 or 4 
respectively. This index takes a value from 0 to 16, with 
larger values denoting more stringent activity restrictions. 
Cihak et al. (2012); 
Barth et al. (2000; 2003; 
2008). 
Supervisory power Index of the powers of the supervisor of the banking sector, 
reflecting whether the supervisory agency has the authority to 
take specific actions to prevent and correct problems in the 
banking sector. Takes values from 0 to 14, with higher values 
Cihak et al. (2012); 
Barth et al. (2000; 2003; 
2008). 
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reflecting more supervisory powers. 
Market discipline This index shows the degree to which banks are forced to 
disclose accurate information to the public and whether there 
are incentives to increase market discipline. Higher values 
indicate higher disclosure requirements and more incentives 
to increase market discipline. It takes values from 0 to 9. 
Cihak et al. (2012), Barth 
et al. (2000; 2003; 2008). 
Bank capital The ratio of total equity to total assets. Bankscope 
Bank liquidity The ratio of liquid assets to total assets. Bankscope 
Bank loan-loss provisions The ratio of loan-loss provisions to total loans. Bankscope 
Bank size The natural logarithm of total assets. Bankscope 
GDP growth Annual rate of GDP growth. WDI 
Gross fixed capital formation Gross fixed capital formation as a share of GDP. Gross fixed 
capital formation includes land improvements, plant, 
machinery, and equipment purchases; and the construction of 
roads, railways, and the like, including schools, offices, 
hospitals, private residential dwellings, and commercial and 
industrial buildings. 
WDI 
Financial development Currency plus demand and interest-bearing liabilities of banks 
and other financial intermediaries (i.e. liquid liabilities) 
divided by GDP. This is the broadest available indicator of 
financial intermediation, since it includes all three financial 
sectors. 
Beck et al. (2000) 
Trade openness Imports plus exports as a share of GDP. Penn World Tables 
Government spending Level of government expenditure as a share of GDP. WDI 
Rule of law Rule of Law captures perceptions of the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, 
and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property 
rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of 
crime and violence. Estimate gives the country’s score on the 
aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, 
i.e. ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5. 
Worldwide Governance 
Indicators 
Interest rate freedom Index for credit market freedom. Interest rate controls and the 
magnitude of negative real interest rates if present. Countries 
with interest rates determined by the market, stable monetary 
policy, and positive real deposit and lending rates received 
higher ratings. When interest rates were determined primarily 
by market forces and the real rates were positive, countries 
were given a rating of 10. A zero rating was assigned when 
the deposit and lending rates were fixed by the government 
and real rates were persistently negative by double-digit 
amounts or hyperinflation had virtually eliminated the credit 
market. 
Economic Freedom of 
the World Project 
Interest rate The lending interest rate adjusted for inflation as measured by 
the GDP deflator. 
WDI 
Inflation The GDP deflator. WDI 
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Table 2. Summary statistics  
The table reports the number of observations and basic summary statistics for the variables used in the empirical 
analysis. Panel A reports the summary statistics for the cross-sectional (cross-country) sample. Panel B  
Variable Observations Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Loan growth 74,875 0.08 0.27 -7.41 6.01 
Capital stringency 78,241 6.87 1.15 3.00 10.00 
Basel risk weights 81,101 0.84 0.36 0.00 1.00 
Credit risk weights 80,423 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Market risk weights 78,848 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Deducted loan losses 79,779 0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Deducted securities 79,406 0.85 0.35 0.00 1.00 
Deducted foreign exchange losses 79,435 0.79 0.41 0.00 1.00 
Revaluation gains 79,731 0.92 0.27 0.00 1.00 
Initial stringency 1 81,031 0.85 0.36 0.00 1.00 
Initial stringency 2 80,992 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Initial stringency 3 81,018 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Bank importance 79,166 0.98 0.51 0.00 2.72 
Market discipline 87,794 5.68 0.90 2.00 9.00 
Supervisory power 87,815 11.09 2.26 1.00 14.00 
Activity restrictions 87,723 8.97 2.48 1.00 16.00 
Bank capital 89,014 0.10 0.08 -2.58 1.00 
Bank liquidity 89,014 0.18 0.16 -0.05 1.00 
Bank loan-loss provisions 86,448 0.01 0.67 -5.70 180.54 
Bank size 89,019 12.87 1.67 7.70 21.51 
GDP growth 82,146 2.25 3.24 -17.96 34.50 
Gross fixed capital formation 81,519 20.29 3.36 2.44 57.71 
Financial development 78,602 0.86 0.48 0.00 4.78 
Trade openness 81,997 59.74 39.88 15.84 445.91 
Government spending 88,756 51.12 20.76 0.00 99.30 
Rule of law 82,151 1.11 0.89 -1.89 2.01 
Interest rate freedom 73,133 8.31 0.87 0.50 10.00 
Interest rate 69,938 5.16 6.74 -72.56 93.92 
Inflation 82,146 3.40 7.49 -32.81 556.94 
 
27 
 
 
Table 3. General capital stringency and credit growth 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) from the estimation of equation (1). The dependent variable in all 
regressions is the bank-level loan growth from year t to year t+1, over the period 1997-2011. All variables are defined in Table 1. All 
regressions are estimated with two-step GMM for dynamic panels and robust standard errors (adjusted with Windmeijer's correction 
procedure), and include year fixed effects. AR2 is the p-value of the Arellano-Bond test for order-2 autocorrelation and Hansen is the 
p-value of the Hansen test for overidentifying restrictions. The *, **, *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% 
level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lagged loan growth 0.075*** 0.089*** 0.075*** 0.093*** 0.074*** 0.088*** 
 (5.224) (5.766) (5.277) (6.092) (5.155) (5.650) 
Bank capital 0.237 0.473* 0.199 0.391* 0.475 1.078** 
 (1.416) (1.707) (1.186) (1.672) (1.084) (2.029) 
Bank liquidity 0.200*** 0.134* 0.186*** 0.161** 0.298** 0.396* 
 (3.602) (1.840) (3.276) (2.091) (1.985) (1.806) 
Capital stringency -0.035** -0.045** -0.034** -0.048*** -0.082** -0.089** 
 (-2.276) (-1.960) (-2.319) (-2.861) (-1.968) (-2.108) 
Capital stringency * Bank capital 0.291** 0.401***   0.311** 0.360*** 
 (2.057) (3.148)   (2.484) (3.577) 
Capital stringency * Bank liquidity   0.142*** 0.182*** 0.182** 0.190** 
  (2.983) (2.957) (2.124) (2.110) 
Bank capital * Bank liquidity     1.425 1.742 
     (0.720) (0.957) 
Capital stringency * Bank capital * 
Bank liquidity 
    0.851** 0.868*** 
    (2.462) (2.867) 
Market discipline 0.015* 0.071*** 0.021* 0.032 0.009 0.075*** 
(1.728) (3.005) (1.764) (1.132) (0.858) (2.918) 
Supervisory power -0.048*** -0.018** -0.043*** -0.040*** -0.050*** -0.020** 
 (-6.655) (-2.051) (-4.510) (-4.084) (-6.517) (-2.256) 
Activity restrictions -0.038*** 0.001 0.025*** -0.002 0.031*** 0.000 
 (-4.724) (0.067) (2.688) (-0.143) (3.706) (0.014) 
Bank loan-loss provisions -0.305 0.217 -0.220 0.324 -0.221 0.236 
 (-1.454) (0.932) (-0.953) (0.942) (-1.052) (0.935) 
Bank size -0.099*** -0.037*** -0.115*** -0.034** -0.105*** -0.035** 
 (-7.950) (-2.726) (-6.096) (-2.059) (-7.707) (-2.461) 
Bank importance 0.051 -0.263** 0.061 -0.229* 0.056 -0.209 
 (1.366) (-2.033) (1.643) (-1.831) (1.500) (-1.580) 
GDP growth 0.021*** 0.043*** 0.022*** 0.039*** 0.020*** 0.046*** 
 (6.056) (5.443) (6.338) (4.937) (5.446) (5.303) 
Gross fixed capital formation  0.039***  0.039***  0.040*** 
  (5.180)  (4.880)  (5.487) 
Financial development 0.243** 0.289** 0.484** 0.423** 0.477*** 0.458*** 
 (2.265) (2.361) (2.073) (2.082) (2.856) (2.715) 
Trade openness  0.003***  0.004***  0.003*** 
  (3.495)  (4.045)  (3.714) 
Government spending  0.005***  0.007***  0.005*** 
  (3.234)  (3.669)  (3.202) 
Rule of law  1.868**  1.765**  1.563** 
  (2.481)  (2.446)  (2.269) 
Interest rate freedom  0.100***  0.072***  0.102*** 
  (4.745)  (3.084)  (4.720) 
Inflation  -0.009*  -0.011**  -0.011** 
  (-1.776)  (-2.113)  (-2.231) 
Observations 58,524 41,275 58,524 41,275 58,524 41,275 
Number of banks 9,473 7,956 9,473 7,956 9,473 7,956 
AR2 0.128 0.236 0.133 0.281 0.111 0.220 
Hansen 0.251 0.183 0.266 0.170 0.303 0.192 
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Table 4. General capital stringency and credit growth: Excluding the crisis period 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) from the estimation of equation (1). The dependent variable in all 
regressions is the bank-level loan growth from year t to year t+1, over the period 1997-2007. All variables are defined in Table 1. All 
regressions are estimated with two-step GMM for dynamic panels and robust standard errors (adjusted with Windmeijer's correction 
procedure). The regressions replicate those of Table 3 in terms of control variables and also include year fixed effects. AR2 is the p-
value of the Arellano-Bond test for order-2 autocorrelation and Hansen is the p-value of the Hansen test for overidentifying 
restrictions. The *, **, *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lagged loan growth 0.058*** 0.095*** 0.056*** 0.086*** 0.060*** 0.089*** 
 (4.044) (5.646) (3.842) (4.486) (4.225) (5.345) 
Bank capital 0.078 -0.199 -0.024 -0.238 -0.267 -0.565 
 (0.389) (-0.785) (-0.123) (-0.781) (-0.491) (-0.674) 
Bank liquidity 0.149** 0.305** 0.137** 0.440*** 0.113* 0.538** 
 (2.450) (2.271) (2.267) (3.093) (1.795) (2.253) 
Capital stringency -0.026* -0.027* -0.025* -0.028* -0.036* -0.024* 
 (-1.854) (-1.897) (-1.779) (-1.797) (-1.922) (-1.864) 
Capital stringency * Bank capital 0.253** 0.265**   0.248*** 0.274* 
 (2.481) (2.591)   (3.530) (1.790) 
Capital stringency * Bank liquidity   0.109*** 0.137*** 0.147** 0.117 
  (2.905) (3.190) (2.196) (1.624) 
Bank capital * Bank liquidity     1.239 1.860 
     (0.617) (0.592) 
Capital stringency * Bank capital * 
Bank liquidity 
    0.665** 0.633** 
    (2.372) (2.014) 
Observations 46,734 33,917 46,734 33,917 46,734 33,917 
Number of banks 8,971 7,588 8,971 7,588 8,971 7,588 
AR2 0.133 0.207 0.125 0.216 0.140 0.201 
Hansen 0.250 0.155 0.207 0.143 0.276 0.158 
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Table 5. General capital stringency and credit growth: Interactions with bank importance, financial development, 
and trade openness 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) from the estimation of equation (1). The dependent variable in 
all regressions is the bank-level loan growth from year t to year t+1, over the period 1997-2007. All variables are defined in 
Table 1. All regressions are estimated with two-step GMM for dynamic panels and robust standard errors (adjusted with 
Windmeijer's correction procedure). The regressions include the full set of control variables also included in Column (2) of 
Table 3 and year fixed effects. AR2 is the p-value of the Arellano-Bond test for order-2 autocorrelation and Hansen is the p-
value of the Hansen test for overidentifying restrictions. The *, **, *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 
1% level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
Bank 
importance 
Financial 
development 
Trade  
openness 
Lagged loan growth 0.079*** 0.084*** 0.085*** 
 
(5.246) (5.817) (5.166) 
Bank capital 0.779** 0.343 -0.406 
 
(2.010) (0.436) (-0.399) 
Capital stringency -0.023 0.434*** 0.124 
 
(-0.472) (4.485) (1.060) 
Capital stringency * Bank capital 0.507 -2.547*** -1.686 
 
(1.558) (-3.019) (-1.428) 
Bank importance 11.418** 9.998*** 7.091*** 
 
(2.441) (3.864) (2.621) 
Bank capital* Bank importance -15.035 
  
 
(-0.722) 
  Capital stringency * Bank importance -1.691 
  
 
(-0.694) 
  Capital stringency * Bank importance* Bank capital 3.617 
  
 
(0.250) 
  Bank capital*Financial development 
 
0.618 
 
  
(0.451) 
 Capital stringency*Financial development 
 
-0.469*** 
 
  
(-4.972) 
 Bank capital*Capital stringency*Financial development 
 
2.894*** 
 
  
(2.761) 
 Trade openness 
  
-0.020 
   
(-0.938) 
Bank capital*Trade openness 
  
0.196 
   
(1.143) 
Capital stringency*Trade openness 
  
-0.028* 
   
(-1.721) 
Bank capital*Capital stringency*Trade  openness 
  
0.370** 
   
(2.184) 
Constant 0.484* 1.030*** 0.599* 
 
(1.697) (3.258) (1.696) 
Observations 40,915 40,915 40,915 
Number of banks 7,847 7,847 7,847 
AR2 0.346 0.288 0.224 
Hansen 0.109 0.115 0.123 
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Table 6. General capital stringency and credit growth: Three-year time intervals 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) from the estimation of equation (1). The panel of banks is averaged over 
three-year time intervals, over the period 1997-2013 (four three-year periods and one four-year period in the earliest years of the 
panel). The dependent variable in all regressions is the bank-level loan growth from the three-year period t to the three-year period 
t+1. All variables are defined in Table 1. All regressions are estimated with two-step GMM for dynamic panels and robust standard 
errors (adjusted with Windmeijer's correction procedure). The regressions replicate those of Table 3 in terms of control variables and 
also include year fixed effects. AR2 is the p-value of the Arellano-Bond test for order-2 autocorrelation and Hansen is the p-value of 
the Hansen test for overidentifying restrictions. The *, **, *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lagged loan growth 0.365*** 0.276*** 0.342*** 0.274*** 0.344*** 0.248*** 
 (5.086) (3.876) (4.606) (3.782) (4.252) (3.560) 
Bank capital 0.078 0.199 0.024 0.238 0.267 0.565 
 (0.389) (0.785) (0.123) (0.781) (0.491) (0.674) 
Bank liquidity 0.149** 0.305** 0.137** 0.440*** 0.113* 0.538** 
 (2.450) (2.271) (2.267) (3.093) (1.795) (2.253) 
Capital stringency -0.016* -0.020* -0.017* -0.019* -0.016* -0.024* 
 (-1.754) (-1.837) (-1.779) (-1.797) (-1.922) (-1.864) 
Capital stringency * Bank capital 0.161* 0.187*   0.148 0.174* 
 (1.841) (1.951)   (1.530) (1.790) 
Capital stringency * Bank liquidity   0.109 0.106 0.107 0.117 
  (1.305) (1.190) (1.296) (1.624) 
Bank capital * Bank liquidity     1.239 1.860 
     (0.617) (0.592) 
Capital stringency * Bank capital * 
Bank liquidity 
    0.665 0.633 
    (1.372) (1.014) 
Observations 15,095 11,091 15,095 11,091 15,095 11,091 
Number of banks 6,916 6,060 6,916 6,060 6,916 6,060 
AR2 0.380 0.404 0.332 0.407 0.346 0.401 
Hansen 0.310 0.255 0.331 0.222 0.384 0.275 
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Table 7. General capital stringency and credit growth: Including interaction terms with all country-year variables 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) from the estimation of equation (1). The dependent variable in all 
regressions is the bank-level loan growth from year t to year t+1, over the period 1997-2011. All variables are defined in Table 1. All 
regressions are estimated with two-step GMM for dynamic panels and robust standard errors (adjusted with Windmeijer's correction 
procedure), and include year fixed effects. The regressions replicate those of Table 3 in terms of control variables and also include 
interaction terms with all the country-year control variables and bank capital and/or liquidity. AR2 is the p-value of the Arellano-Bond 
test for order-2 autocorrelation and Hansen is the p-value of the Hansen test for overidentifying restrictions. The *, **, *** marks 
denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lagged loan growth 0.063*** 0.092*** 0.068*** 0.085*** 0.065*** 0.086*** 
 (3.860) (5.457) (4.330) (5.145) (3.931) (5.310) 
Bank capital 0.131 0.391* 0.120 0.206 0.128 0.249 
 (1.133) (1.788) (0.100) (0.715) (1.214) (1.327) 
Bank liquidity 0.132** 0.104* 0.167** 0.140** 0.113* 0.538** 
 (2.140) (1.871) (2.267) (2.093) (1.795) (3.253) 
Capital stringency -0.030** -0.027* -0.036** -0.042** -0.036* -0.031** 
 (-1.964) (-1.892) (-2.365) (-2.437) (-2.355) (-2.064) 
Capital stringency * Bank capital 0.275*** 0.257***   0.260*** 0.284*** 
 (3.064) (2.991)   (3.607) (2.790) 
Capital stringency * Bank liquidity   0.165*** 0.170*** 0.205** 0.223* 
  (3.211) (3.230) (2.449) (1.856) 
Bank capital * Bank liquidity     1.416 1.807 
     (0.705) (0.919) 
Capital stringency * Bank capital * 
Bank liquidity 
    0.824** 0.916** 
    (2.362) (2.155) 
Observations 46,734 33,917 46,734 33,917 46,734 33,917 
Number of banks 8,971 7,588 8,971 7,588 8,971 7,588 
AR2 0.144 0.233 0.156 0.228 0.149 0.217 
Hansen 0.227 0.165 0.221 0.125 0.274 0.146 
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Table 8. Credit growth and capital stringency components: Interaction terms with bank capital 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) from the estimation of regressions on a panel of banks across countries over 1997-2013. The dependent variable in all regressions is 
the bank-level loan growth from year t to year t+1, over the period 1997-2011. The variables are defined in Table 1. Columns (1)-(10) include the components of the capital stringency variable as 
these are defined in Table 1 and provided in the first line of the Table. All regressions are estimated with two-step GMM for dynamic panels and robust standard errors (adjusted with 
Windmeijer's correction procedure). The regressions include the full set of control variables also included in Column (2) of Table 3 and year fixed effects. AR2 is the p-value of the Arellano-
Bond test for order-2 autocorrelation and Hansen is the p-value of the Hansen test for overidentifying restrictions. The *, **, *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
Basel risk 
weights 
Credit risk 
weights 
Market risk 
weights 
Deducted 
loan losses 
Deducted 
securities 
Deducted for. 
ex. losses 
Revaluation  
gains 
Initial 
stringency 1 
Initial 
stringency 2 
Initial 
stringency 3 
Lagged loan growth 0.067*** 0.065*** 0.060*** 0.083*** 0.084*** 0.089*** 0.076*** 0.085*** 0.084*** 0.097*** 
 
(5.705) (4.827) (4.428) (6.122) (6.258) (6.099) (4.390) (6.340) (5.679) (6.887) 
Stringency component -0.050*** -0.053*** -0.007 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.003 -0.048*** -0.010 -0.042** 
 
(-3.173) (-3.301) (-0.566) (0.114) (0.348) (0.063) (0.349) (-3.105) (-0.768) (-2.426) 
Bank capital 0.202 0.265** 0.229* 0.221* 0.208 0.179 0.171 0.270** 0.286** 0.244* 
 
(1.533) (2.049) (1.895) (1.705) (1.500) (1.205) (1.154) (2.101) (2.371) (1.958) 
Stringency component * Bank capital 0.401** 0.446** 0.111 0.121 0.123 0.112 0.041 0.244* 0.024 0.275** 
 (2.305) (2.455) (1.016) (1.287) (1.294) (1.272) (0.550) (1.952) (0.391) (2.410) 
Observations 41,275 41,275 41,275 41,275 41,275 41,275 41,275 41,275 41,275 41,275 
Number of banks 7,956 7,956 7,956 7,956 7,956 7,956 7,956 7,956 7,956 7,956 
AR2 0.205 0.212 0.314 0.271 0.127 0.407 0.139 0.205 0.320 0.217 
Hansen 0.126 0.130 0.155 0.145 0.202 0.106 0.146 0.245 0.204 0.181 
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Table 9. Credit growth and capital stringency components: Interaction terms with bank liquidity 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) from the estimation of regressions on a panel of banks across countries over 1997-2013. The dependent variable in all 
regressions is the bank-level loan growth from year t to year t+1, over the period 1997-2011. The variables are defined in Table 1. Columns (1)-(10) include the components of the 
capital stringency variable as these are defined in Table 1 and provided in the first line of the Table. All regressions are estimated with two-step GMM for dynamic panels and robust 
standard errors (adjusted with Windmeijer's correction procedure). The regressions include the full set of control variables also included in Column (2) of Table 3 and year fixed effects. 
AR2 is the p-value of the Arellano-Bond test for order-2 autocorrelation and Hansen is the p-value of the Hansen test for overidentifying restrictions. The *, **, *** marks denote 
statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
Basel risk 
weights 
Credit risk 
weights 
Market risk 
weights 
Deducted 
loan losses 
Deducted 
securities 
Deducted for. 
ex. losses 
Revaluation  
gains 
Initial 
stringency 1 
Initial 
stringency 2 
Initial 
stringency 3 
Lagged loan growth 0.060*** 0.069*** 0.065*** 0.079*** 0.079*** 0.077*** 0.054*** 0.063*** 0.077*** 0.088*** 
 (4.929) (5.007) (4.797) (5.569) (5.813) (5.463) (2.745) (4.498) (5.160) (6.013) 
Stringency component -0.034** -0.024 0.021 -0.005 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.056*** 0.020 -0.039** 
 (-2.289) (-1.536) (0.816) (-0.371) (-0.128) (-0.258) (-0.217) (-3.348) (0.238) (-2.015) 
Bank liquidity 0.165** 0.139* 0.158** 0.195*** 0.202** 0.224** 0.157** 0.158** 0.146** 0.173** 
 (2.164) (1.902) (2.106) (2.265) (2.388) (2.462) (2.060) (2.087) (1.971) (2.188) 
Stringency component * Bank 
liquidity 
0.165** 0.050 0.021 -0.090 -0.078 -0.073 0.005 0.172*** 0.049 0.160*** 
(2.476) (0.624) (0.989) (-0.749) (-0.529) (-0.494) (0.267) (2.904) (1.007) (3.033) 
Observations 41,275 41,275 41,275 41,275 41,275 41,275 41,275 41,275 41,275 41,275 
Number of banks 7,956 7,956 7,956 7,956 7,956 7,956 7,956 7,956 7,956 7,956 
AR2 0.246 0.210 0.288 0.206 0.235 0.192 0.197 0.256 0.249 0.213 
Hansen 0.108 0.116 0.104 0.186 0.238 0.307 0.225 0.151 0.184 0.116 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. General capital stringency and credit growth: Using non-performing loans 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) from the estimation of equation (1). The 
dependent variable in all regressions is the bank-level loan growth from year t to year t+1, over the period 
1997-2011. All variables are defined in Table 1. All regressions are estimated with two-step GMM for 
dynamic panels and robust standard errors (adjusted with Windmeijer's correction procedure), and include 
year fixed effects. AR2 is the p-value of the Arellano-Bond test for order-2 autocorrelation and Hansen is the 
p-value of the Hansen test for overidentifying restrictions. The *, **, *** marks denote statistical significance 
at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) 
 
Baseline Baseline 
Lagged loan growth 0.103*** 0.101*** 
 
(7.348) (7.233) 
Bank capital -0.032 0.609** 
 
(-0.154) (1.998) 
Capital stringency -0.039** -0.033 
 
(-2.010) (-1.512) 
Bank capital*Capital stringency 0.557*** 0.567*** 
 
(3.577) (3.582) 
Market discipline 0.059*** 0.039 
 
(3.217) (1.592) 
Supervisory power -0.020*** -0.023*** 
 
(-3.068) (-3.040) 
Activity restrictions -0.018 -0.012 
 
(-1.529) (-0.977) 
Bank liquidity 0.216*** 0.437*** 
 
(3.015) (4.848) 
Non-performing loans -0.004** -0.005 
 
(-2.083) (-1.578) 
Bank size -0.065*** -0.049*** 
 
(-6.350) (-4.219) 
Bank importance 0.021 -0.186* 
 
(0.676) (-1.769) 
GDP growth annual 0.020*** 0.031*** 
 
(5.536) (3.969) 
Interest rate 
 
0.004 
  
(0.957) 
Gross fixed capital formation 
 
-0.030*** 
  
(-4.375) 
Financial development 
 
0.289*** 
  
(3.019) 
Trade openness 
 
0.000 
  
(0.638) 
Government spending 
 
-0.007*** 
  
(-3.943) 
Rule of law 
 
0.093*** 
  
(7.111) 
Inflation 
 
0.010*** 
  
(3.574) 
Constant 1.022*** 0.965*** 
 
(6.522) (3.666) 
Observations 34,973 32,212 
Number of bname 6,313 5,712 
AR2 0.159 0.122 
Hansen 0.251 0.207 
 
